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CHISOM v. ROEMER: 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
by Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin' 
In an era increasingly marked by the Supreme Court's 
willingness to restrict the scope of civil rights statutes and 
precedents1, on June 20, 1991, the Court surprised its critics by 
extending the ambit of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In Chisom v. 
Roemers and Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of 
Terns4 the Court held, by 6-3 majorities6, that section 2' of the 
* Associate Professor of Law. Pace University. B.A., Columbia University (1975); 
J.D., Haward University (1978). Chief Counsel to plaintiffs in France v. Cuomo, 92 Civ. 
No. 1144 (JES) (S.D.N.Y.), challenging, under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $1973, 
the at-large election of New York State's supreme court justices. 
I wish to thank Adjunct Professor Elfrida A. Scott-McLaughlin, my colleague 
and wife, for her constant support, review and critique of the final draft. Additionally, 
I thank my research assistants, Dan Cherner and William DeVito, for their diligent 
work. 
1. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 60 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1992) (Court 
adopted restrictive interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1973, permitting 
county commissioners to limit scope of individual commissioner's authority aher election 
of African-American commissioner.); Patterson v. McClean, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (Court 
decided that 42 U.S.C. Q 1981 did not cover racial harassment.); Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 755 (1989) (Court permitted post-judgment challenge to court-ordered affirmative 
action plan by white employees who had notice of employment discrimination suit and 
declined to intervene.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (Court 
increased plaintiffs burden of proof in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. $ 2000-e-2(a), cases.). See also 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 
55,65 n.55 (1991) (There appears to be a deliberate retrenchment by a majority of the 
current Supreme Court on many basic issues of human rights that Thurgood Marshall 
advocated and that the Warren and Burger Courts vindicated.*) 
2. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 et seq. 
3. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). 
4. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). 
5. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in Chisom in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. 111 S. Ct. a t  2369. Justice Kennedy also filed 
a separate dissent. Id. at  2376. Similarly, in Houston Lawyers' Justice Scalia dissented, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. 111 S. Ct. a t  2382. 
6. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, provides: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in 
a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 4(!X2), as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality 
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Voting Rights Act applied to the election of state court judges. In 
Chisom the court was presented with the issue of Congressional intent 
as to the scope of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when the statute 
was amended in 1982. It was undisputed that section 2 as originally . 
enacted covered the election of state judges.' The narrow question was 
whether Congress intended by the use of the word "representativen in 
the amended section 2' to exclude state court judges from the statute's 
coverage.' The Court concluded that Congress' use of the word 
"representatives" in the statute was not intended to limit the scope of 
section 2 to the executive and legislative branches of government.1° 
Having determined in Chisom that section 2 applied to the election of 
state court appellate judges, the Court had little difficulty in extending 
the holding in Houston Lawyers' Association to include trial court 
judges. 
In Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association, the Court 
declined to address two substantive issues critical for pending and 
future litigation" challenging the at-large election of state judges.I2 
of circumstances, i t  is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or  political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) in that ita members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to 
which members of a protected class have been elected to ofice in the 
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right 
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to 
their proportion in the population. 
42 U.S.C. 8 1973 (1982). 
7. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. a t  2362. Accord 111 S. Ct. a t  2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I 
agree with the Court that the original legislation . . . applied to all elections.") 
8. Section 2(b) provides that a violation is established if minorities have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to "participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. $1973(b) (emphasis supplied). 
9. Traditionally, judges are not considered representatives. See Wells v. Edwards. 
347 F. Supp. 453, summarily afd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973) (District court concluded that 
the concept of one person, one vote did not apply to judicial elections since judges were 
not representatives.) 
10. 111 S. Ct. a t  2366-67. 
11 Such suits are pending in New York. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, North 
Carolina. Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Louisiana. See Judge Suits Thrive, Natl L. J., 
.Mar. 9. 1992. a t  6. 
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The Court expressly stated that it would not decide the elements that 
must be proved to establish a violation of section 2 or the remedy that 
would bi appropriate for a violation proven in the context of a judicial 
election." 
Part I1 will discuss the Chisom and Houston Lawyers' 
Association decisions. Analysis of these decisions, combined with a 
review of the legislative history, supports the Court's view of the 
amended section 2. In fact, there was no direct or indirect suggestion 
at  any point in the extensive legislative history that Congress intended 
to exclude judicial elections from the coverage of section 2. Part I11 will 
address the liability issue left unanswered by the court. To determine 
whether the at-large election of judges violates section 2, the courts 
should apply the standards developed in Thornburg v. Gingles.14 The 
Gingles Court concluded that three threshold questions were critical 
to a challenge of an at-large election system. In order to prevail in a 
vote dilution15 case, plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the 
minority population was geographically concentrated, politically 
cohesive, and that racial bloc voting existed in the jurisdiction.16 
12. In an at-large election, a candidate must achieve a plurality or majority of 
votes from all the citizens of a county or city who are entitled to vote in an election. In 
jurisdictions where African-Americans, Hispanics, or Asians constitute a minority of the 
voters, white voters can use racial bloc voting tendencies to defeat minority candidates. 
An alternative to the at-large election is a district or ward system. In a district election, 
a candidate must achieve a majority or plurality of votes from the citizens residing in his 
or her district. Where minority groups are geographically concentrated, districts can be 
created that afford members of those groups a fair opportunity to nominate and elect 
candidates of their choice as required by section 2. See, e.g., Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority 
Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 353 (1976); 
Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group 
Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in Minority 
Vote Dilution 65 (Chandler Davidson, paperback ed. 1984). 
13. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. a t  2361. 
14. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
15. Dilution of a minority group's voting strength may be caused by the dispersal 
of the group into districts in which they constitute a minority of voters or from 
overconcentration of members of the group into districts where they constitute an 
excessive majority. The former condition is called ucracking" and the latter is termed 
"packing". See, e.g., Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 
Vand. L. Rev. 523 (1973); Frank Parker, Racially Geriymndering and Legislative 
Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 86 (Chandler Davidson, paperback ed. 1984). 
16. 478 U.S. a t  50. The reason for requiring these three factors as prima facie 
elements of proof is that unless a minority group is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single district, the group can not contend that the 
at-large system has prevented them from electing candidates of their choice. Unless the 
minority voters would have the potential to nominate or elect candidates of their choice 
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Additionally, the courts should utilize the factors identified in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's report that accompanied the 
amendments to section 2." 
In Part IV, alternatives to at-large election systems will be 
examined to determine the appropriate remedy where a state's judicial 
election system violates section 2. Traditionally, the courts have 
remedied at-large election violations by creating smaller subdistricts 
where minority group members constitute a majority of the district." 
The article concludes that the courts should review at-large judicial 
systems utilizing the same criteria that have been developed in vote 
in the absence of the challenged at-large system, they can not claim that their rights 
have been violated by that practice. Similarly, in the absence of racial bloc voting 
patterns, an at-large election system would not enable a white majority, by voting as a 
bloc, to defeat minority candidates. 
17. The Senate Report noted that the following factors might be probative of a 
section 2 violation: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or 
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the 
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process; 
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used 
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti- 
single shot pr&sions, or other voting practices or procedures that 
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group; 
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the 
minority group have been denied access to that process; 
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or 
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas 
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or 
subtle racial appeals; 
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been 
elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
S. Rep. No. 417,97th Cong., 2nd Sess., a t  28-29 (19821, (footnotes omitted) reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 [hereinafter S. Rep.]. The Court in Gingles stated that the Senate 
Report was the authoritative guide to the meaning of the amended section 2. 478 U.S. 
a t  43 n.7. 
18. See, eg., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Citizens For A Better 
Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 
(7th Cir. 19841, cert. denied, 471 U.S 1135 (1984); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 
(5th Cir. 1973). affd per curium sub nom., East Carroll Parish School District v. 
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). 
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dilution challenges to other at-large election systems. Similarly, the 
remedial measures that have been employed to correct violations of 
section 2 in challenges to other at-large election systems should be 
equally applicable in the judicial context. 
A. Chisom v. Roemer 
In Chisom, African-American voters challenged the method for 
electing justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court from the New Orleans 
area. The Louisiana Supreme Court contained seven justices, two of 
whom were elected from the first supreme court district, consisting of 
the parishes of Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson. 
African-Americans constituted more than one-half of the registered 
voters in Orleans parish whereas more than three-fourths of the 
registered voters in the other three parishes in the first supreme court 
district were white. Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that the 
submergence of the predominantly African-American voters of Orleans 
parish into the majority white parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, 
and Jefferson weakened their voting strength in violation of section 
2.19 
19. Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183, 184 (E.D. La. 1987). As a remedy for 
the perceived violation, plaintiffs argued that each of the seven justices of the Louisiana 
supreme court should be elected from separate judicial districts. With respect to the first 
supreme court judicial district, the plaintiffs proposed that it be subdivided into two 
separate subdistricts. One subdistrict would contain Orleans parish. The other 
subdistrict would consist of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. Chisom. 
Under plaintiffs' proposal each of the seven justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
would be elected from a separate district. By subdividing the first supreme court district 
into a majority African-American and majority white districts, African-American voters 
would have an opportunity to nominate and elect one supreme court justice from Orleans 
parish. 
The district court dismissed the complaint and determined that judicial 
elections were not covered by section 2. Chisom a t  187. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion regarding the applicability of 
section 2 to judicial elections. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). The circuit court held that 
Congress' use of the term %epresentativew in the 1982 amendments to section 2 was not 
intended to remove judicial elections from the coverage of the statute. Id. at  1063. The 
court interpreted the term %presentativen as denoting an office holder selected by 
popular election from among a field of candidates. Id. 
On iemand, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish 
a violation of section 2 under the standards articulated in Gingles. Chisom v. Roemer, 
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The sole question before the Court was whether Congress, 
when it amended section 2 in 1982, intended to remove judicial 
elections from the statute's scope.20 The Court noted that i t  was 
undisputed that section 2 as originally enacted applied to judicial 
 election^.^^ In light of the plain meaning of the original section 2, its 
purpose and legislative history, the Court determined that as enacted 
in 1965, section 2 applied to all  election^.^ 
Having determined that all elections, including judicial 
elections came within the purview of the original provisions of section 
2, the .Court turned to the central issue: whether Congress, in 
amending section 2, used the term "representative" to limit the scope 
of the statute.23 The Court stated that the term "representative" was 
Civ. Act. No. 86-4057.1989 106485 (E.D. La. 1989). While plaintiffs' appeal of the 
district court's opinion was pending, the fiRh circuit, sitting en bane, in League of United 
Latin American Citizens Council No. 4234 u. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990). 
rejected the earlier panel decision in Chisom and concluded that Congress's use of the 
term "representative" in section 2 waa intended to exclude judicial elections from the 
statute's protections. Following the LULAC decision, the fZth circuit remanded Chisom 
and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint. Chisom v. Roemer, 917 F.2d 187 
(5th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. 
Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991). 
20. 111 S. Ct. a t  2361. The Court expressly reserved judgment concerning the 
elements that must be proved in order to establish a section 2 violation when at-large 
judicial elections are challenged or the appropriate remedy for such a violation. Id. 
21. Id. at  2361. The text of section 2 as originally enacted provided: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of color. 
Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 8 1973 (1964 ed. Supp. I.). The term "vote" or 
%oting" was defined as "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, 
special. or general election." Q14(c) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,79 Stat. 445 (1965). 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, in testimony before the House of Representatives 
regarding the scope of the original section 2, testified that "every election in which 
registered voters are permitted to vote would be covered" under section 2. Hearings on 
H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals to Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong.. 1st Sess., 21 (1965). 
22. 111 S. Ct. a t  2362 ("Section 2 protected the right to vote, and it did so without 
making any distinctions or imposing any limitations as to which elections would fall 
within its purview."). 
23. Section 2(b) provides that a violation of subsection (a) is established if i t  is 
shown that racial and language minorities %ave less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice." This phrase was patterned after language used in White u. Regester, 412 U.S. 
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broader than "legislator" and rejected the contention that Congress, by 
adopting the former, intended to remove judges from the scope of 
section 2. In the Court's opinion, the change from legislator to 
representative implied that Congress intended the statute to apply to 
members of the judiciary as well as the legislative branch.% The 
Court believed that the term "representative" was intended to include 
the winners of popular elections, not just legislative contests.% The 
Court reasoned that if members of the executive branch of government 
could be considered "representativesn by virtue of having been selected 
by popular election, then the same could be said of elected judges.2s 
Additionally, the Court considered judges policymakers who brought 
to the bench a consideration of what was in the best interest of the 
~ommunity.~' Based on the relationship between the elected judges, 
the voters, and the role that judges play in American society, the Court 
decided that elected judges were representatives within the meaning 
of section 2's use of that term. 
The Court, in rejecting the argument that Congress intended 
to restrict the coverage of section 2, observed that such an intent would 
have been made explicit in the statute. At the very least, the 
legislative history would have mentioned that the use of the term 
"representative" was intended to restrict the categories of elections that 
came within the purview of the amended section 2.= Congress' silence 
755,766 (1973) (The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence . . . that its members had 
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political 
process and to elect legislators of their choice.") and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 
149 (1971) (Plaintiffs had to show that they "had less opportunity than did other . . . 
residents to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their choice.") 
See S. Rep. a t  27 (Section 2(b) was intended to "embodLy] the test laid down by the 
Supreme Court in White."). 
24. 111 S. Ct. a t  2366. 
25. The Court observed that: 
If executive officers, such as prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys 
general, and state treasurers, can be considered %epresentatives" 
simply because they are chosen by popular election, then the same 
reasoning should apply to elected judges. 
111 S. Ct. a t  2366. 
26. 111 S. Ct. a t  2366. 
27. Id. at  2366 n.27. 
28. Id. at  2364. The Court likened the absence in the legislative history of any 
reference to the limiting effect of the term "representative* to the dog that did not bark. 
Id. at  2364 n.23. In reaching the conclusion that some member of Congress would have 
noted such a radical change if the amendments were designed to exclude judicial 
elections, the Court quoted Harrison v. PPB Industries, 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissentingxln a case where the construction of legislative language . . 
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in this regard was interpreted by the Court to mean that the statute's 
scope was coextensive with the original section 2." The Court 
expressed its belief that Congress, which had made an express effort 
to broaden the protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act3' would 
not, without comment, withdraw an important category of elections 
from that p r~ tec t ion .~~  
The Court also rejected the contention that since judicial 
elections were not governed by the fourteenth amendment's "one- 
person, one-vote standards", first articulated in Gray v. Sanders,32 
such elections should be immune from vote dilution claims under 
section 2.33 The flaw in this argument is that one-person, one-vote 
claims and vote dilution claims address two completely different issues. 
In order to prevail under the one-person, one-vote standard, a plaintiff 
. makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change . . . I think judges as well as 
detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the 
night."). See also American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1543-44 (1991). 
29. 111 S. Ct. a t  2368. 
30. The conclusion that Congress intended to broaden the protections of the Act 
is supported by the legislative history of the 1982 amendments. In amending the statute, 
Congress sought to eradicate the Court's limiting decision in Mobik v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (1980). In Mobik, the Court determined that in order to establish a violation of the 
fifteenth amendment and section 2, a voting rights plaintiff had to prove that the 
challenged practice or procedure had been adopted or was being maintained in order to 
discriminate intentionally against racial minorities. Id. at  60-61. The Chisom Court 
stated that Congress in 1982 eliminated the intent requirement of section 2 and replaced 
it with a results test. Under the new test, a plaintiff could prevail by demonstrating that 
a challenged election practice resulted in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote 
on account of race or color. 
In reaching its conclusion regarding the intent of Congress in amending the 
Voting Rights Act in 1982, the Court relied on the report of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary that accompanied the amended section 2. 111 S. Ct. a t  2363 n.20. The Senate 
Report stated that: 
This amendment is designed to make clear that proof of 
discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of 
Section 2. It thereby restores the legal standards . . . which applied 
in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation involved in 
Mobik v. Bolden. 
S. Rep. a t  2 (footnotes omitted). 
31. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. a t  2368. 
32. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
33. The Court in a per curiam opinion had upheld a district court's decision that 
judicial elections were not subject to the one-person, one-vote standard. Wells v. 
Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (19731, affg, 409 F. Supp 453 (M.D. La. 1972). 
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has to demonstrate the existence of a numerical imbalancesM whereas 
in a vote dilution claim the key issue is whether a practice or 
procedure operates in a fashion to deny or abridge the right to vote to 
racial or language minorities. In fact, a claim can pass muster under 
the one-person, one-vote test and violate section 2's vote dilution 
standard.35 The Court concluded that the inapplicability of the one- 
person, one-vote rule to judicial elections did not insulate those 
elections from vote dilution claims. 
In light of the legislative history of the amendments, the 
Court's interpretation of that section was consistent with Congress' 
intent. According to the Senate Report,% the objective of Congress in 
amending section 2 was, in part, to clarify the standards for proving 
.a violation of that section3' by eliminating proof of discriminatory 
intent as an element of a section 2 case and restoring the legal 
standards that predated the restrictive Mobile de~ision.'~ Nothing in 
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to eliminate 
judicial elections from the scope of the amended section 2?9 Given the 
complete absence of any suggestion in the legislative history that the 
revisions to section 2 were designed to restrict the scope of the original 
34. The Court in Gmy held that under the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, 
[olnce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be 
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have 
an equal vote - whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever 
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home 
may be in that geographical unit. 
372 U.S. a t  369. The rule has been interpreted to mean that 'each person's vote counts 
as  much, insofar as it is practicable, as any other person's." Hadley v. Junior College 
District, 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970). 
35. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S 755 (1973) (Court reversed finding that 
state reapportionment plan violated one-person, one-vote standard, but sustained finding 
of racial vote dilution.); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,751 (1973) (Court held that 
one-person, one-vote principle was inapplicable to a claim of racially based vote dilution.); 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) ('[Allthough 
population is the proper measure of equality in apportionment . . . the Supreme Court 
announced that access to the political process and not population was the barometer of 
dilution of minority voting strength."). 
36. The Court in Gingles, 478 U.S. a t  43 n.7, concluded that the Senate Report 
should be considered as an authoritative source of the legislative intent behind the 1982 
amendments. 
37. S. Rep., supm note 17, a t  2. 
38. Id. a t  179. 
39. In fact, Senator Omn Hatch commented that the amended section 2 would 
"encompas[s] all governmental units, including. . .judicial districts." Id. at  151. 
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statute by excluding judicial elections, the Court properly concluded 
that no such radical change was intended. 
A review of the Senate Report further reveals that the terms 
"representative", "candidate" and "elected officials" were used 
interchangeably, buttressing the conclusion that Congress did not 
choose the term "representativen to have a limiting effect.40 The 
Chisom Court read section 2(b) contextually and found that the use of 
the term was not meant to limit the statute to elections for the 
representative branch of government." This interpretation is 
consistent with the Court's view that the Voting Rights Act should be 
construed as having the broadest possible scope.42 
The Chisom Court was also correct in rejecting the argument 
that judicial elections were exempt from vote dilution claims because 
of the exclusion of such elections from one-person one-vote challenges. 
Because the two claims are premised on different questions, the 
standard utilized to determine the validity of an apportionment plan 
should not govern racial vote dilution cases. A malapportionment claim 
is based on the fourteenth amendment and addresses issues of equality 
of pop~ la t i on .~  Section 2 claims are based on the Voting Rights Act 
40. See, e.g., S. Rep., supm note 17 a t  16 ("elected officialsa); id. a t  28 ('7f as a 
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is 
a violation of this section.') (emphasis added); id. a t  29 n.115 ("[Tlhe election of a few 
minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black 
vote in violation of this section.") (emphasis added); id at  30 ("[Tlhe ultimate test would 
be the White standard codified by this amendment of Section 2: whether, in the 
particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal 
opportunity to participate and to elect ca-8 of their choice.") (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis added); id. at  31 ("The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers 
to fashion the relief so that it . . . provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to 
participate and elect candidates of their choice.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); 
id. a t  32 ( m h e  wurta looked to determine whether. . . the members of the minority 
group had the same 'opportunity' as others in the electorate to 'participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.") (emphasis added). 
41. It is a well-settled axiom of statutory construction that Yhe meaning of a 
statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parta together and in 
their relation to the end in view." Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 
(1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
42. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,566-567 (1966). 
43. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50.56 (1970) ("[Wlhen members 
of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established 
on a basis that will insure, as far as  is practicable, that equal numbera of voters can vote 
for proportionally equal numbers of oficials."); Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp 453,455 
(1972). 
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and are concerned with the racial composition of the election districts 
not the equal apportionment of population in these electoral units.u 
A redistricting scheme may violate section 2 if the change submerges 
a geographically and politically cohesive minority population in a 
majority white district, even though the challenged plans satisfies the 
one-person, one-vote ~tandard.~'  The determination that judicial 
elections are not subject to a malapportionment challenge thus has no 
relevance to the issue of whether those elections may be subject to a 
claim that the election system denies minority voters an  equal 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 
The Chisom Court was correct in concluding that the scope of 
section 2 remained unchanged. Both Congressional intent to lessen the 
proof burdens of plaintiffs in voting rights cases and the complete 
absence of any mention in the extensive legislative history that judicial 
elections were to be excluded from the protections afforded under the 
amended section 2 provide additional support for the Court's decision. 
Further, the Court's refusal to rely on the one-person, one-vote 
standard to limit the scope of section 2 in the judicial context 
demonstrates that the Court was willing to give the section the 
broadest possible interpretation. 
44. Senator Hatch recognized this distinction and acknowledged that vote dilution 
and malapportionment claims.were separate and distinct. 128 Cong. Rec. 13,129 (1982) 
(Senator Hatch stating that the one-person one-vote standard 'is an entirely different 
concept than the one that has evolved under provisions of the Voting Righta Act..). 
45. In White, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's conclusion that a 
state reapportionment plan violated one-person, one-vote standards, but sustained the 
finding that the plan diluted minority voting strength. 412 U.S. a t  761-64, 765-70. See 
also Gaffney v. Cumminga, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (One-person, one-vote standard 
inapplicable to a claim of racially-based vote dilution.) Accord Voter Information Project 
v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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B. Houston LawyersJAssociation v. Attorney General of Texasa 
Houston LawyersJ Association was a challenge to the at-large 
election of trial court judges in ten counties in Texas.47 The Court 
granted certiorari for the limited purpose of deciding the legitimacy of 
the fifth circuit's conclusion that the election of trial judges was not 
subject to section 2 review.@ As in Chisom, the Court concluded that 
elections for state court trial judges were covered by section 2's 
requirements. In reaching its conclusion, the Court put to rest the 
notion that certain offices were exempt from section 2's review.49 The 
Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act encompassed the election of 
46. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). There were two organizational petitioners in Houston 
Lawyers' Association, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the 
Houston Lawyers' Association. LULAC, a Texas statewide organization composed of 
Mexican-Americans and African-American residents of Texas, had challenged the at-large 
election system used by Texas in the election of district judges. The Fifth Circuit panel 
held that the election of trial judges was not subject to section 2. LULAC v. Clements, 
902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990). After granting rehearing en banc, the circuit court held 
that all judicial elections were not subject to section 2. LULAC v. Clements, 914 F.2d. 
620 (5th Cir. 1990). Houston Lawyers Association, an organization of African-American 
attorneys, intervened in support of the original plaintiffs in LULAC and sought review 
in the Supreme Court of the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision. 111 S. Ct. a t  2378. 
47. Texas district courts are the trial courts of general jurisdiction and are elected 
fmm judicial districts. Eight of the challenged judicial districts elected district judges 
fmm a single county and two elected judges from a bi-county district. Each judicial 
candidate was required to be a resident of the district in which helahe sought judicial 
office. Candidates for district court sought election for a separately numbered seat or 
post. The petitioners contended that the at-large, district wide election system diluted 
the voting strength of African-American and Mexican-American voters due to the 
submergence of these minority groups into a white majority population that was able 
usually to defeat minority preferred candidates. 111 S. Ct. a t  2378-79. 
48. 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991). 
49. The panel in LULAC had decided that since Texas district court judges were 
'single-member office" holders, section 2 was inapplicable. 902 F.2d a t  308. The panel 
relied on the second circuit's decision in Butts v. City of New York, 779 F. 2d 141 (2nd 
Cir. 19851, cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (19861, distinguishing elections for multi-member 
bodies from single member offices. The Butts court concluded that whereas in an election 
to a multi-member body, a minority class has an opportunity to secure a share of 
representation equal to that of other classes by electing its members fmm districts, there 
could be no share of a single-member office, and, therefore, a section 2 vote dilution 
challenge was inappropriate. 779 F. 2d a t  148. Similarly, the panel, in rejecting LULAC's 
claim, stated that since The full authority of a trial judge's office is exercised exclusively 
by one individual," a vote dilution challenge must fail because "there can be no share of 
such a single-member office." 902 F.2d at  308. 
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executive officers and trial judges notwithstanding the fact that these 
office holders act independently or that one person only holds the 
office.* However, despite its decision that single-member office hold- 
ers, including trial judges, were subject to the Voting Rights Act, the 
Court concluded that a state's interest in the maintenance of an at- 
large judicial election system was a legitimate factor to be weighed 
under the totality of circumstances test of section 2.'l However, the 
Court cautioned that the state's interest was merely one factor to be 
considered and that interest would not in every case be sufficient to 
outweigh proof of racial vote dil~tion.'~ 
The Court's rejection of the single-member theory in Houston 
Lawyers' Association was justified as applied to the election of trial 
court judges. Even if this theory had merit in other contexts, which the 
Court questioned, the single-member exception was inappropriate as 
applied to trial judges. The hallmark of a single-member office is that 
there is only one office holder for an entire geographic region, therefore 
the jurisdiction can not be subdivided without changing the form of 
government to a multi-member body. In counties that hold at-large 
elections for trial judges, numerous judges are elected from each 
county or judicial district and several judges serve within the district. 
Such is not the case where a single mayor is elected in a city. Thus, 
the question becomes whether the judicial district can be subdivided 
into smaller geographical units so that the votes of minority electors 
are not submerged into a bloc of white votes. The Butts case, upon 
which the panel relied in its decision, does not address that issue, and 
the Court was correct in rejecting the application of the single-member 
office theory to the election of multiple judges on an at-large basis. 
Additionally, the Court's refusal to allow the state's interest in 
maintaining at-large judicial elections to exclude those contests from 
vote dilution challenges furthers the interests of the Act. Under the 
Court's ruling, a state may argue that it has a compelling interest in 
the maintenance of such a system, but such considerations will be 
relevant at  the liability phase or the remedial phase of a vote dilution 
litigation only and cannot be used to exclude judicial contests from 
section 2's coverage. 
50. 111 S. Ct. at 2380. 
51. Id. at 2381. 
52. Id. at 2381. 
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A. Thornburg v. Gingless3 
Notwithstanding the Court's inclusion of state court judicial 
elections in the coverage of section 2, the Court's failure to address 
liability or remedial issues has created little guidance for the courts 
and potential litigants. With respect to establishing liability, the Court 
in Gingles set forth the criteria for a vote dilution case under the 
amended section 2, and this standard should be applicable to judicial 
elections. 
In Gingles, the Court had the occasion to interpret the recently 
amended Voting Rights Act and to establish the standard of proof 
under section 2. The Court relied primarily on the Senate Report to aid 
in the interpretive pro~ess.'~ According to the Senate Report, the 
primary question in a vote dilution challenge is whether, as a result of 
the challenged voting practice or structure, minority group members 
do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process 
and to elect candidates of their choice.55 The Report lists certain 
factors in an effort to provide guidance in the determination of this 
issue.66 In addition to these factors, the Report states that evidence 
53. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
54. The Court noted that it had recognized repeatedly that the committee report. 
on a bill were the authoritative source for legislative intent. 478 U.S. a t  43; Garcia v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969). 
55. 478 U.S. a t  44; See also S. Rep., supm note 17, a t  28. 
56. The Senate Report noted the probity of the following factors in a section 2 
violation: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or 
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the 
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process; 
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used 
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti- 
single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that 
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group; 
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the 
minority group have been denied access to that process; 
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or 
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concerning the degree to which elected officials are responsive to the 
needs of members of minority groups may have probative value?' The 
Report also indicates that the interest of the state in the maintenance 
of the challenged structure is also relevant to the determination of a 
vote dilution challenge.* The Gingles Court recognized that these fac- 
tors were important to deciding a vote dilution challenge, but stressed 
that the Report stated that the list of factors was neither 
comprehensive nor exclu~ive .~~ In the Court's analysis, the 
determination of the degree of minority access to the political process 
should be made on the basis of a practical evaluation of the present 
and past reality, combined with a functional view of the political pro- 
~ e s s . ~  
After setting forth its o v e ~ e w  of the determination of a 
section 2 violation, as evidenced by the Senate Report, the Court 
turned to an examination of the elements of a vote dilution challenge. 
The Court stated that the essence of a section 2 claim was that an  
election law, practice or structure, in conjunction with social and 
historical conditions, resulted in the diminution of the ability of 
minority voters to elect their preferred candidates?' The Court in 
prior decisions had recognized that at-large election schemes can 
operate to deny minority group members equal access to the political 
process." However, the Court cautioned that minority group members 
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas 
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process; 
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or 
subtle racial appeals; 
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been 
elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
S. Rep., supra note 17, a t  28-29. 
57. S. Rep., supm note 17, at  29. 
58. Id. at  29. 
59. Gingles. 478 U.S. a t  45. 
60. Id. at  45. 
61. Id. a t  47. 
62. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 
613,617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 at  765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124,143 (1971). See also Barbara L. Berry & Thomas R. Dye, The Discriminatory 
Effects of At-Large Elections. 7 Fla St. U. L. Rev. 85 (1979); James Blacksher & Larry 
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 Hastings L.J. 1 (1982); 
Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Lurge Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 
Ga. L. Rev 353 (1976); Katherine I. Butler. Constitutiod and Statutory Chulknges to 
Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 La. L. Rev. 851 
(1982). 
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who challenge such systems must prove that the use of the challenged 
structure operates to minimize the ability of the group to elect their 
preferred candidatesB3 
In order to prevail on a claim that the use of a multimember 
or at-large election system dilutes minority voting strength, the Court 
stated that the following circumstances must be found by the district 
court. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a single- 
member distri~t.~" Additionally, the minority group must be able to 
show that it is politically cohesive.65 Finally, the group must establish 
that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to 
defeat minority ~and ida t e s .~  By demonstrating the existence of these 
factors, the minority group can establish that submergence in a white 
multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen 
representatives. 
The standard delineated in Gingles should be applicable to a 
section 2 challenge to an at-large judicial election system. In order to 
prevail, minority group plaintiffs must make a threshold showing that 
its members are so geographically compact that single-member 
districts could be created in which they constitute a numerical 
majority. Additionally, if the minority group offers proof of minority 
political cohesion and racially polarized voting patterns among white 
voters they could establish that the conjunction of the submergence of 
the minority group into the larger white district, and the at-large 
63. Gingles, 478 U.S. a t  48. 
64. Gingles, 478 U.S. a t  50. Unless the minority group has the potential to elect 
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure, there can be no dilution. The 
single-member district is the appropriate standard against which to measure the 
potential of the minority group to elect candidates of its choice because it is the smallest 
political unit from which representatives are elected. Id. at  50 n.17. If the minority 
group is dispersed throughout an at-large district or county or is so numerically small 
that it could not constitute a mqjority in a single-member district, the group cannot 
maintain that they can elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the 
challenged structure because a smaller political subdistrict or unit could not be created 
consistent with the Constitution's one-person one-vote standard. 
65. Id. at  51. 
66. Id. at  51. In the absence of significant white bloc voting, it can not be 
contended that the ability of minority group members to elect their chosen 
representatives was inferior to white voters or that the at-large structure impeded the 
ability of minorities to win at  the polls. See, e.g.. McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 
F.2d 1037,1043 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Commission, 731 F.2d 
1546,1566 (11th Cir. 19841, appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 951 (1984); Nevitt 
v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980). 
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nature of the election system, resulted in a diminution of the group's 
ability to elect candidates of their choice. 
Once this threshold showing is made, the court may explore the 
evidence concerning the other factors discussed in Gingles and listed 
in the Senate Report.e7 At this point, the state's interest in 
maintaining the at-large system as it stands should be weighed. While 
the Houston Lawyers'Associution Court did not provide guidance as to 
how much weight the state's interests are allowed, in light of the 
purpose of the Act to correct a pernicious history of discriminationw 
in the exercise of the franchise, the state should be required to 
demonstrate a compelling reason before such an interest outweighs 
proof of the Gingles threshold factors. This approach has been 
employed with varying results in cases involving challenges to the at- 
large election of state court judges.69 
B. Clark u. Roemer7' 
In Clark, plaintiffs claimed that the use of multimember 
districts to elect family court, district court and court of appeals judges 
diluted black voting strength in violation of section 2.'' Although the 
67. See supm note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of these factors. 
68. The Senate Report discussed the history of racial discrimination in the exercise 
of the franchise as follows: 
[Tlraditionally, black Americans were denied the franchise 
throughout the South. After statutory bars to voting by blacks were 
lifted, the main device was denial of voter registration - by violence, 
by harassment, and by the use of literacy testa or other screening 
methods. 
S. Rep., supra note 17, a t  5. 
69. Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991) (District court found section 
2 violations employing Gingles test and Senate Report factors); Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference v. Evans, 785 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (District court 
rejected challenge to at-large judicial election system). 
70. This case was originally filed against Governor Edwin W. Edwards. Charles 
Roemer, Edwards' successor in office, was substituted as a defendant. Clark v. Edwards, 
725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988). 
71. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp at  285. There were 178 district court judges in 
Louisiana, 169 of whom were elected from multimember districts. Id. at  289. In judicial 
districts that elected more than one district court judge, the elections were held under 
an at-large system consisting of the entire district (multimember districts). Id. a t  287-88. 
Such districts ranged in size from 345 square miles to 2239 square miles. Id. a t  300. At 
the time of the litigation, African-Americans held only five of the district court 
judgeships. Id. at  299. 
There were five circuit courts of appeal, each of which was divided into 
separate elections districts. There were 48 court of appeals judges in Louisiana, 44 of 
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decision on liability was made prior to the Court's rulings in Chisom 
and Houston Lawyers' Association, the district court utilized the 
Gingles analysis and the Senate Report's factors in reaching its 
conclusion that the at-large judicial system in Louisiana violated the 
The district court analyzed the facts and found that numerous 
Senate Report factors," connoting a possible violation, were evident. 
There had been a long history of official discrimination in Louisiana 
that touched on the right of African-American citizens to register, to 
vote and to otherwise participate in the democratic process.74 In 
finding the existence of racially polarized voting patterns in elections 
in each of the family court, district court and court of appeals judicial 
districts, the court relied on prior judicial findings7' on this issue and 
the testimony of two experts.76 The court concluded that there were 
whom were elected from multimember districts. In those districts that contained more 
than one judge, the judges were elected on an atlarge district basis. Id. a t  288. The court 
of appeals districts ranged in size from 19.344 qua re  miles to 350 square miles. Id. a t  
300. The family court in East Baton Rouge Parish, the 6nly family court district 
challenged by plaintiffs, was composed of three judges who were elected a t  large from the 
entire parish. African-Americans constituted 31.3% of the population of the parish. Id. 
a t  288. One African-American had been elected to the court of appeals. 
Candidates for district court, appellate court judgeships from multimember 
districts and.family court judgeshipa in East Baton Rouge Parish ran for a designated 
post &thin the district. There was a district residency requirement for the 
aforementioned judicial offices. With respect to the multimember court of appeals 
districts, there was an additional requirement that the candidate be a resident of the 
circuit and the respective district. Id. a t  288. Primaries were conducted on a non-partisan 
basis. The two top candidates in the primary would compete at  the general election with 
a majority vote requirement. Id. at  290. 
72. In reaching ita conclusion, the district court followed the Fifth Circuit's panel 
decision in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). that held that judicial 
elections were subject to the requirements of section 2. 
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for discussion of the Senate Report's 
typical factors. 
74. 725 F. Supp. a t  295. The court took judicial notice of prior decisions finding 
the existence of & jure and de facto discrimination regarding blacks and the right of 
suffrage. See Chisom v. Edwards, 690 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. La. 1988); Major v. Treen, 574 
F. Supp. 325,339-41 (E.D. La. 1983). 
75. See Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La. 
19861, affd, 834 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 
1983); East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Parish of Jefferson, 
691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988). 
76. Dr. Richard Engetrom, who testified for the plaintiffs, found widespread racial 
polarization in voting in Louisiana. The defendants' expert. Dr. Ronald E. Weber, 
reached the same conclusion. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. a t  296. 
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substantial socio-economic disparities between African-Americans and 
whites in Louisiana, which were viewed by the court as vestiges of past 
discrimination that hindered the ability of African-Americans to 
participate effectively in the political process.77 The court also found 
that racial appeals had been utilized in election campaigns involving 
candidates of different races.78 The court also noted the paucity of 
African-American representation in the challenged judicial offices?9 
The court did not find that the size of the districts was a hindrance to 
African-American participation. Additionally, the district court decided 
that the requirement that candidates run for specific posts limited the 
ability of African-Americans to elect candidates of their c h o i ~ e . ~  
After reviewing the Senate Report factors, the district court 
analyzed the facts in light of the Gingles threshold test. The court 
interpreted Gingles as holding that multimember districts did not 
violate section 2 unless a politically cohesive minority group was 
~ ~ c i e n t l y  numerous to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district and white racial bloc voting prevented the election of minority 
preferred candidates?' The court found that African-Americans were 
sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in single-member subdistricts in twenty-four district court 
multimember districts, and the family court district of East Baton 
Rouge Par i~h . '~  The court also found that single-member majority 
African-American districts could be established in each of the existing 
circuit courts of appeals  district^.'^ In all of these districts, white 
majorities had voted to defeat minority preferred candidates." In 
light of its findings, the court concluded that the use of multimember 
election districts and circuit-wide election districts in judicial elections 
afforded African-Americans less opportunity to elect candidates of their 
choice.85 
After the decisions in Chisom and Houston Lawyers' 
77. Id. at 299. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 301. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 301-02. 
83. Id. at 301. 
84. Id. In a subsequent opinion after conducting a district by district analysis of 
the Ginglos factors, the district court revised its findings and concluded that violations 
had been established in only nine district court judicial districts, the family court for the 
East Baton Rouge judicial district, and one district of the court of appeals. Clark v. 
Roemer. 777 F. Supp. 445,469 (M.D. La. 1990). 
85. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. at 302. 
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Association, the court reexamined its findings in light of the holding in 
the latter case that the state's interest in maintaining a link between 
a district judge's jurisdiction and the area of residency of his or her 
voters was a relevant factor to be considered under a totality of the 
circumstances a n a l ~ s i s . ~  In support of its linkage argument, the 
state presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the state had 
a vital interest in linking a judge's jurisdiction and the residency of the 
voters that elect that judge. The witnesses also stated that election 
from smaller subdistricts would create a perception of "hometown 
justice."87 After reviewing the record on the issue of the state's 
interest in maintaining linkage, the district court concluded that the 
state failed to explain adequately the basis for its contention that such 
linkage was of vital interest to the state.88 In light of its conclusion, 
the court held that the state's purported interest did not preclude a 
finding of a section 2 violation regarding the at-large method of judicial 
election. 
The Clark decision is a well-reasoned, thoughtful analysis of 
the issues involved in determining whether judicial elections violate 
the rights of minorities. The district court in several opinions 
conducted an intense review of the evidentiary record in light of the 
Senate Report factors and the Gingles test. After reviewing all the 
evidence, the stipulations of the parties, and prior judicial decisions in 
the jurisdiction in vote dilution cases, the court determined that a 
violation had been established. Additionally, following the Houston 
Lawyer's Association decision the court afforded the parties the 
opportunity to demonstrate the existence of a state interest in 
maintaining a link between a judge's jurisdiction and the residency of 
the voters that elect that judge. The court required the state to carry 
its burden by demonstrating that there was a factual basis for such a 
linkage. After reviewing the evidence submitted, the court determined 
that the state had failed to demonstrate adequately that such a 
linkage was required to effectuate a governmental interest and 
rearmed its liability finding. Requiring the party seeking to avoid a 
liability finding to demonstrate the necessity for the maintenance of a 
system that hinders minorities from gaining equal access to judicial 
office is a sound approach given the weight and importance of the right 
86. Clark v. Roemer. 777 F. Supp. 471,479 (M.D. La. 1991). 
87. Id. at 479. 
88. Id. 
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to vote without discriminatory impediments in American society.sg 
C. Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) v. Evansw 
In SCLC, plaintiffs challenged the at-large election system 
utilized in Alabama for electing trial judges as violative of section 2.9' 
The district court noted that while Chisom rejected the contention that 
judicial elections were not subject to a vote dilution challenge, the 
Supreme Court gave the district courts little guidance as to how to 
evaluate such a challenge under section 2.92 Despite the difficulties 
in negotiating what it believed to be uncharted waters, the district 
court evaluated the evidentiary record in light of the Gingles standard. 
The district court began its analysis by noting that two of the 
three threshold Gingles questions had been answered in the 
finnative. All parties agreed that the minority group was sufficiently 
numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district in all but one of the challenged circuits and in 
each of the four challenged  district^?^ Additionally, the court found 
that plaintiffs had established political c~hesion.'~ The court also 
found that Alabama had a history of discrimination and 
disenfranchisement of minority groups and that there was evidence of 
racial appeals in some judicial election  contest^?^ The court did not 
consider the size of the challenged circuits or the majority vote 
requirement as an impediment to political participation by 
minoritie~.'~ The issue of racially polarized voting patterns was 
disputed by the defendants?' The court reviewed the testimony of the 
9 
89. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (The right of suffrage is 
fundamental in a democratic society, and alleged infringements of the right to vote must 
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.); accord Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); 
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
90. Civ. Act. No. 88-H-462-N. 1992 WL 51575 (M.D. Ala.) 
91. Alabama has a unified judicial system of trial and appellate courts. The circuit 
court is the trial court of general jurisdiction. Circuit courts are divided into forty 
judicial circuits. Each circuit consists of one or more counties. The number of circuit 
court judges in the challenged circuits ranged from twenty-four to two. The district 
courts are trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Each county has at  least one district court 
judge. Candidates for judicial ofice in multimember circuits or districts compete for 
designated posts. Id. a t  *I. 
92. Id. at  *2. 
93. Id. at  *4. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at  *4. 
96. Id. a t  '9. 
97. Id. 
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parties' experts and found that significant racially polarized voting did 
not exist." 
In addition to examining the Gingles and Senate Report's 
factors, the court also analyzed issues that it believed had particular 
relevance to a judicial vote dilution case. The first of these issues was 
the number of African-Americans lawyers residing in the challenged 
circuits or districts. The court noted that the number of African- 
Americans serving in judicial positions in Alabama was far less 
proportionally than the number of African-Americans in the general 
population. The court discounted this fact by noting that there was a 
paucity of African-American lawyers qualified to seek judicial positions 
98. Id. at  *5. With respect to the racial polarization issue, plaintiffs' expert, Dr. 
Allan Lichtman, analyzed approximately three hundred election contests over a ten year 
period in which voters were offered a choice of an  African-American and a white 
candidate. In those races, Dr. Lichtman found that African-American voters tended to 
vote for African-American candidates and white voters voted for white candidates. 
However, the district court discounted this evidence, based on the fact that Dr. Lichtman 
examined only interracial election contests. Id. at  *5. 
There are two critical reasons for examining interracial contests. First, in 
order to demonstrate political cohesion, plaintiffs must establish that African-Americans 
vote for African-American candidates when given a choice. Second, in order to establish 
that white voters have tended to vote as a bloc to defeat minority preferred candidates. 
election contests that clearly present choices between white and African-American 
candidates can be examined for evidence of such polarization. In the absence of such 
proof, the Gingks factors cannot be established. In ignoring the evidence of interracial 
election contests, the district court failed to comprehend the significance of this evidence 
in establishing racial polarization. 
This view of the relevance of racially polarized voting patterns is confirmed by 
Gingles. The Court notes that '[blecause both minority and mqjority voters often select 
members of their own race as their preferred candidate, it will trequently be the case 
that an African-American candidate is the choice of African-Americans, while a white 
candidate is the choice of whites." 478 U.S. a t  68. Thus, the critical issue in 
determining racially polarized voting is 'the stutlrs of the candidate as the chosen 
representative of a particular mcial group.D Id. (emphasis in original). The issue to be 
determined is which candidate would be chosen by the minority voters in election 
contests where minorities are given an opportunity to vote for a minority candidate. If 
that candidate received a majority of the minority vote, it is reasonable to infer that that 
candidate was the minority preferred candidate. Similarly, in such a race, if white voters 
tended to oppose the election of a minority candidate, the court could infer that white 
voters tended to vote as a bloc to defeat a minority preferred candidate. The danger in 
relying, as the district court did in SCLC, on contests in which no minority candidate 
competes is the absence of a statistical tool to determine whether minorities voted for a 
white candidate because he or she was in fad  their choice or because there was no 
minority candidate in the election contest. 
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in the ~ t a t e . ~  In the challenged circuits and districts where there 
were no African-American judges, there were also few qualified 
African-American lawyers residing in those districts and circuits. In 
contrast, according to the court's analysis, in those circuits where 
African-American judges had been elected, those judges occupied more 
than a proportionate share of the judicial offices in comparison with 
the number of African-Americans residing in those districts who were 
qualified to run for the subject offices.loO In weighing this evidence, 
the court analogized a voting rights case to an employment 
discrimination case. The court noted that in employment 
discrimination cases involving exclusion from skilled jobs, the district 
courts utilize a smaller statistical pool to determine if minorities have 
been denied skilled positions, and that a larger statistical pool is used 
where a case involves nonskilled jobs.lO' If this approach is employed 
in a voting rights case where there were few African-American lawyers 
qualified to seek judicial office by election, there could be no claim of 
discriminatory exclusion. Utilizing the employment discrimination 
analysis, the court concluded, in light of the limited number of 
qualified African-American attorneys residing in the challenged 
districts, that the state had a compelling state interest in maintaining 
a large pool of lawyers from which to make selections for judicial 
seats.'02 
The court also accepted the state's argument that Alabama had 
99. There were 9,600 licensed lawyera in Alabama, and only 295 were African- 
American. Id. a t  *7. 
100. The tenth judicial circuit had three African-American circuit judges out of 
twenty four. It had no African-American district judges out of eleven. According to the 
court's analysis, the proportionate number of African-American trial judges in the tenth 
circuit was 8.6%, whereas only 3.48% of the qualified lawyers were African-American in 
that circuit. Id. a t  *7. The thirteenth circuit had fourteen circuit judges, one of whom 
was African-American and only one African-American district judge. The court found 
that African-American lawyers held 14.3% of the judicial positions, but constituted only 
2.1% of the pool from which judicial ofices are filled. Id. a t  *8. Similarly, in the 
fifteenth circuit, one of seven circuit judges was African-American and all of the three 
district judges were white. The court concluded that African-American attorneys made 
up 5% of the qualified attomeys, yet held 10% of the judicial seats. Id 
101. Id. a t  *8. The court observed that "[wlhen 'special qualifications are required 
to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller 
p u p  of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative 
value! "Id. (quoting Hazelwood School Districtv. U.S., 433 U.S. 299,307-08 n. 13 (1977). 
See also Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); J.A. 
Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 
940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991). 
102. Civ. Act. No. 88-H462-N. 1992 WL 51575 at  '12. 
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a strong interest in linking a judge's jurisdiction to the population that 
elects the judge.lo3 The court also gave credence to the view that a 
subdistrict remedy would create the perception for a litigant from 
outside the judge's election district that a degree of bias exists in favor 
of an opponent from the judge's electorate."" In light of the foregoing 
and its analysis of the Gingles and Senate Report factors, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs' claims. 
The most problematic feature of the district court's 
determination of the issues in SCLC was the adoption of an 
employment discrimination standard. By incorporating a standard 
from employment discrimination law, the court completely defeated the 
purpose of the Voting Rights Act. The Act is not meant to protect 
employment rights of excluded African-American lawyers or 
candidates. The purpose of the Act is to guarantee that minority voters 
will not be disenfranchised by election systems or practices adopted by 
the majority that work to dilute the voting strength of protected class 
members. Essentially, the Act seeks to protect the minority from the 
effects of discriminatory voting practices. The Act is not an equal 
employment opportunity bill, and therefore considerations appropriate 
to a case involving exclusion from the workforce have no relevance in 
determining whether African-American voters have had an equal 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. In a voting rights 
case, the focus is on the rights of the voters, not the rights of the 
candidates. 
This view of the Act is supported by the Senate Report's 
discussion of the meaning of amended section 2. According to the 
Report, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged system results in the 
denial of access to the political process.105 Thus, Section 2 protects 
the right of minority voters to be free from election practices, 
procedures or methods that deny them the same opportunity to 
participate in the electoral process as other citizens enjoy.lW In the 
twenty-three cases that were examined in the Senate Report, the issue 
in each case was whether the members of the minority group had the 
same opportunity as others in the electorate to participate and elect 
representatives of their choice.lo7 At no point in the legislative 
103. Id. at *lo. 
104. Id. 
105. S. Rep., suprn note 17, at 27. 
106. Id. at 28. 
107. Id. at 32. 
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history was there any suggestion that the number of potential 
candidates residing in a challenged district was a relevant issue in 
resolving a vote dilution claim. 
It is also disingenuous to rely on the paucity of qualified 
candidates residing in the challenged districts as a determining factor 
in a vote dilution case given the mobility of American citizens. It may 
well be the case that few potential African-American candidates reside 
in a challenged district because of the existence of an at-large election 
system that dilutes the voting strength of a politically and 
geographically cohesive minority group. Additionally, if a court finds 
in favor of a voting rights plaintiff and creates a subdistricting remedy, 
such a remedial provision may encourage the migration of minority 
candidates to that district who might otherwise not have resided there 
because of the lack of success of other candidates under the at-large 
system. Because of these reasons, it is inappropriate to utilize the 
proportion or number of potential candidates residing in a district as  
a controlling factor in a vote dilution case. 
The court also incorrectly used the paucity of prospective 
minority candidates residing in the challenged areas as support for the 
state's interest in preserving a qualified judiciary. By accepting this 
premise as a legitimate state concern and terminating the inquiry a t  
the liability phase, the court denied plaintiffs the opportunity to 
demonstrate that there were other, less discriminatory means to 
accomplish the state's purpose. Rather, the court should have afforded 
plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate the existence of alternatives 
to the at-large election system that could be employed to both remedy 
the vote dilution of minority group members and protect the state's 
interest in a qualified judiciary. One possible remedy would be to 
replace the at-large system with subdistricts and eliminate the 
requirement that a candidate reside within the geographical 
subdistr i~t . '~~ This approach furthers the rights protected under 
108. This approach was used in Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 
1987), a pre-Chisom decision, where the court noted at  the liability phase that in some 
of the challenged counties there were few statutorily qualified African-American lawyers 
in residence. Id. at  1184. African-Americans constituted 35% of the population of 
Mississippi and 3.7% of the lawyers. Of 5,900 lawyers admitted in Mississippi, only 220 
were African-American. Only 150 of the African-American lawyers had the statutory 
qualifications for the subject judicial offices. Id. at  1193. Despite the paucity of qualified 
African-American lawyers, the court viewed this only as a factor in determining the vote 
dilution claim, not as a controlling factor, as the court did in SCLC. Id. at  1193 At the 
remedial phase, the court decided to create subdistricts for the challenged judicial ofices 
and eliminated any subdistrict residency requirement. The court stated that the ruling 
was necessitated by the lack of statutorily qualified African-American candidates for 
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section 2 without impermissibly intruding on a state's right to 
establish legitimate qualification standards. 
The Supreme Court in Chisom established that judicial 
elections are subject to the dictates of section 2. However, the issue of 
liability determination was not addressed by the Court. This issue 
should be determined in the judicial context as in other vote dilution 
challenges to at-large election systems. Specifically, courts should 
review the facts in light of the standards enunciated in Gingles and 
the Senate Report factors. This approach is a functional one which 
permits an appraisal of the facts of each case and affords all parties 
the opportunity to present evidence that will assist the court in 
determining liability. Additionally, the state's interest in the 
maintenance of an at-large system should be treated as one factor 
among many that the court should consider in reaching its liability 
determination. However, if the court concludes that the state's interest 
is a compelling one, plaintiffs should have the opportunity at the 
remedial stage to offer alternatives to the at-large system that will 
remedy the dilution of minority voting strength and accommodate the 
state's interest. 
judicial office residing in some of the subdistricts. The court, in eliminating the 
residency requirement, balanced the state's interest in having qualified candidates 
against the right of minorities to have equal access to the political process. Martin v. 
Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327,332-33 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (At the remedial stage, Governor Ray 
Mabus was substituted for former Governor William A. Allain.) Id. at  327. The court 
concluded that the state's interests could be protected by an alternative system that did 
not impede the ability of minorities to elect judicial candidates of their choice. By 
employing a balancing approach, the court was able to accommodate the state's interest 
in maintaining a qualified judiciary and protect the minority group's voting rights. 
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In successful vote dilution challenges to at-large election 
systems, the courts have traditionally utilized the subdistricting 
remedy to alleviate the section 2  violation^.'^^ In creating a 
subdistricting remedy, the courts carefully scrutinized proposed plans 
to ensure that minorities have an equal opportunity to elect candidates 
of their ch~ice."~ Courts have also taken into account traditional 
redistricting criteria in the creation of subdistrict plans."' Two 
district courts have considered the issue of fashioning remedies where 
a violation of section 2 exists in a state's at-large judicial election 
In both cases, the courts considered numerous alternatives to 
the at-large multimember judicial election system. After evidentiary 
hearings and consideration of the applicable law, both the Martin and 
Clark courts decided that single-member districts were the most 
appropriate means to remedy the proven violations. 
109. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); East Carroll Parish School 
Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curium); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 
(1975); Mahan v. Howell. 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971) 
(per curium). See also Pamela Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.4.L. Rev. 173 (1989); 
Danial Oritz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawfil At-Large 
Systems, 92 Yale L.J. 144 (1982). 
110. The preferred method to ensure that result is the creation of 'safe" districts 
where racial minorities have an effective electoral majority. Because the proportion of 
minorities who are of voting age tends to be less than that of other groups and minorities 
have lower registration and turnout rates, the courts have created supermajority 
districts. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,164 (1977) ("[Slubstantial 
nonwhite population majority - in the vicinity of 65% - would be required to achieve a 
nonwhite majority of eligible voters."); Kethcum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984). 
111. Typical criteria include compactness, contiguousness, and population equality. 
See, e.g., Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1981); Marshall 
v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). For an 
application of these criteria to the creation ofjudicial subdistricts see infra notes 120,121 
and 150 and accompanying text. 
112. Martin v. Mabus. 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.Miss. 1988); Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. 
Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990) (pre-Chisom) and 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991) (post- 
Chisom). 
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A. Martin v. Mabus 
In Martin, the plaintiffs challenged the at-large election of 
circuit, chancery and certain county court judges in the state of 
Mississippi as violative of section 2. After a trial on the issue of 
liability, the district court found section 2 violations in eight of the 
challenged  district^."^ At the remedy phase, the court decided that 
the creation of single-member subdistricts for election purposes was 
the most effective remedy for the section 2  violation^."^ Judges were 
to be elected from subdistricts but their jurisdiction would not be 
linked with their electorate. Thus, judges elected on a subdistrict basis 
could serve in their entire judicial di~trict."~ The court also ruled 
that there would be a judicial district residency requirement, but 
judicial candidates would not be required to reside within their election 
subdistrict. The court refused to require election district residency 
because of the low number or absence of qualified candidates in some 
subdistri~ts."~ By not requiring residency within the subdistrict, the 
court balanced the minority group's rights against the state's interest 
and sought to accommodate both by requiring that judicial candidates 
reside within the jurisdictional district but not the smaller election 
subdistrict. 
In the remedial phase, the court noted that where a section 2 
113. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183. 1204 (S.D.Miss. 1987). The court found 
violations in the fifth, seventh, ninth and eleventh chancery court districts, the fourth, 
seventh, eleventh circuit court districts, and the Hinds county court district. The 
chancery court is an equity and probate trial court of unlimited jurisdiction. The circuit 
courts are the law trial courts of unlimited jurisdiction. Id. a t  1187. The state was 
divided into twenty chancery and twenty circuit court districts. All districts were drawn 
according to county lines. With the exception of two single-county chancery districts, the 
chancery districts contained from two to six counties. There were thirty-nine chancery 
judges, six of whom were elected from single judge districts. Of the twenty circuit court 
districts, only one was a single-county district. The other nineteen districts contained 
two to seven counties. There were forty circuit judges, six of whom were elected from 
single-county districts. In all chancery and circuit court multi-judge districts, judges 
were elected district-wide and to numbered posts. Each judge must be a resident of his 
or her district. Id. 
114. 700 F. Supp. a t  332. 
115. ' Id. 
116. Judicial candidates in Mississippi are required to be over thirty years of age 
and practicing attorneys for five years, thereby reducing the number of potentially 
eligible candidates. Id. a t  332-33. See supm note 108 for a complete discussion of the 
court's rationale for not requiring subdistrict residency. 
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violation has been found, the court must fashion a remedy that is both 
commensurate with the violation found and completely remedies the 
dilution of minority voting strength. While the court recognized that 
i t  was not bound by the doctrine of one-person, one-vote in the creation 
of s~bdistricts,"~ it acknowledged that general equitable principles 
required that population variance be minimized between sub- 
distri~ts."~ In an effort to devise an appropriate remedy, the court, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a), appointed an expert to 
draft proposed subdi~tricts."~ Although the court believed that 
creating judicial subdistricts presented different issues than traditional 
legislative redistricting, the court instructed its expert to use certain 
general redistricting criteria.l2' The court directed its expert to use 
these criteria in descending order.l2l 
At the hearing on the expert's plan, the plaintiffs challenged 
the numerical percentage of the African-American majority in certain 
117. See Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453,454-55 (M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge 
court), affd  mern., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973); Voter Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton 
Rouge, 612 F.2d 208,211 (5th Cir. 1980). 
118. 700 F. Supp. a t  333. 
119. Id. at  331. 
120. The traditional criteria include compactness, contiguity, community of 
interest, natural boundaries, and preservation of existing precinct lines. 700 F. Supp. at 
332. The court believed that the community of interest criteria should be applied 
differently in the judicial redistricting context. The court stated that "[slevere ethical 
restrictions are placed on an attorney's capabilities in campaigningfor judicial office, and 
. . . lawyers are better known by their association with their home communities and 
home counties rather than with the district as a whole." Id. at  332. 
121. The criteria framed by the court were as follows: 
(1) In each district there should be at  least one judicial sub-district 
with a black majority population of 60%. . . . 
(2) The single member sub-districts must be contiguous and should 
be as compact as possible. . . . 
(3) In multi-county districts, whole counties should be preserved 
where possible. . . . 
(4) Where possible, cities or towns, with the exception of Jackson, 
Mississippi, should not be divided among separate sub-districts. . . 
(5) Where counties have to be divided, the sub-districts should be 
drawn along current precinct lines. . . . 
(6) Precincts should not be divided among separate judicial sub- 
districts. . . . 
(7) If a county or city has to be divided, wherever possible common 
lines should be used for both circuit and chancery court sub-district 
boundary lines. . . . 
(8) A 15% maximum range of deviation is allowable for population 
variance among sub-districts within a judicial district. 
700 F. Supp. a t  333-35. 
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subdistr i~ts . '~  The plaintiffs had proposed that these subdistricts 
have a 68.5% majority because of lower voter registration rates among 
African-Americans in Mis~issippi.'~~ The court rejected the plaintiffs 
approach and adopted a 60% numerical majority for minority 
subdistricts. The court believed that the higher figure was unnecessary 
to ensure minority success at  the polls because of recent electoral 
victories in predominantly minority districts with less than a 65% 
majority.'" The court also rejected the 68.5% majority because i t  
feared that such a requirement would overconcentrate minorities into 
districts and lessen their ability to influence judicial races in adjacent 
s~bdis t r ic ts . '~~ 
In addition to critiquing the court's criteria and the plan 
proposed by its expert, the plaintiffs proposed an alternative to the 
subdistricting remedy. One alternative was a limited voting procedure. 
Under that proposal, at-large multimember districts would be retained 
and voters would be allocated fewer votes than the judgeships to be 
filled a t  an e lec t i~n . '~~  The court rejected this alternative as 
experimental and unnecessary in the context of the pending litigation. 
122. Id. a t  335. 
123. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Allan Lichtman, conducted a study that suggested that 
54% of the African-American voting age population was registered and 79% of the white 
voting age population was registered. 700 F. Supp. a t  335. A guideline of 65% of the 
total podat ion  has been approved by the Supreme Court as representing the proportion 
of minority population required to ensure minorities a fair opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 
(1977) (White, J.) ('[Slubstantial nonwhite population majority - in the vicinity of 65% - 
would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters."). 
124. The court noted that in the second congressional district with an African- 
American majority of between 58-605, an African-American candidate, Mike Espy, was 
successful in a 1986 race. 700 F. Supp. a t  333. The second congressional district covered 
the same geographical area as the proposed majority African-American judicial 
subdistrict. Id. 
125. Id. at  333-34. 
126. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Richard Engstrom, described two different variants of 
the limited voting procedure. Under a single, non-transferable limited voting system, 
in judicial districts with two or three judgeships, voters would be able to cast a vote for 
only one judge a t  each election. Under a double, non-transferable system, in judicial 
districts with four judgeships, voters could cast ballots for two judges at  each election. 
According to Dr. Engstrom, this system remedies minority vote dilution by eliminating 
the submergence of a cohesive minority group. 700 F. Supp. a t  337. This system also 
eliminates the winner-take-all feature of the at-large system and may be useful in cases 
where minorities are not geographically compact. See Karlan, supm note 109. The court 
noted that limited voting systems had been adopted in consent decrees in section 2 cases 
in Alabama and North Carolina. 700 F. Supp. a t  337. 
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It found that subdistricts were an adequate remedy.12' After 
reviewing its expert's redistricting plan and the critique of that plan 
by plaintiffs' experts, the court ordered the creation of sub-districts. 
While questions may remain regarding the court's use of a 60% 
majority and the criteria it developed to guide its expert, the court did 
engage in a local appraisal of the factors it believed pertinent to the 
creation of a workable remedy. In terms of the numerical prerequisite, 
the court did not accept an ironclad requirement of a 65% majority. In 
so doing, the court correctly examined the voting behavior, turnout, 
and registration rates of the minorities living in the subject districts. 
After making an analysis of the opportunity for electoral success in the 
districts involved in the litigation, the court developed a 60% threshold 
requirement. This approach is a sound one. Rather than utilize a 65% 
yardstick in all cases, courts seeking a remedy for a section 2 violation 
should study minority electoral success in the jurisdiction in order to 
determine the appropriate numerical majority in minority subdistricts. 
Without evidence of voter behavior, a court that creates supermajority 
minority districts may be overconcentrating minorities or packing them 
into a district and lessening their ability to achieve a majority in one 
district and influence elections in an adjacent district where they 
constitute a sizable percentage of the population. 
The court also correctly declined to accept plaintiffs' limited 
voting alternative to the at-large election system. Having found that 
minority group members were sufYiciently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, the court 
properly concluded that such an approach was unnecessary. However, 
that option may be viable in cases where the defendants are able to 
prevail on a claim that the state has a compelling state interest in 
maintaining an at-large judicial election system. In cases where the 
state has demonstrated a legitimate interest in maintaining an at- 
large election system, the limited voting method could be utilized to 
protect the state's interest and provide a remedy for a violation of 
section 2. The advantage of a limited voting system is that it prevents 
a numerical majority from bloc voting to fill all the judicial offices. By 
limiting the votes of both the majority and the minority group, the 
latter has an opportunity to elect a portion of the office holders, and 
the winner-take-all feature of the at-large election system is thereby 
eliminated. The possible disadvantage of this approach is that it 
requires a sophisticated electorate. Minority voters must understand 
that they have to aggregate their votes behind a minority candidate in 
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order to achieve electoral success. Since, in most instances, local 
judicial contests are not highly visible contests, the limited voting 
option may not be a realistic choice to remedy section 2 violations. 
Additionally, in Martin, the court employed the appropriate 
approach with respect to the issue of the low number of potential 
candidates residing in subdistricts. Unlike the court in SCLC, the 
Martin court did not view the paucity of potential candidates as a 
controlling factor. Despite the concern over this issue, the court 
realized that there was another method to ensure an adequate number 
of qualified candidates and afford minority group members an equal 
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Rather than enshrine 
the at-large election system as the sole means of preserving the state's 
interest, the court ruled that judicial candidates did not have to reside 
within their election subdistrict and provided that judges elected from 
smaller geographical units would have jurisdiction in the entire 
judicial district. By balancing the state's interest and the minority 
group members' right to equal access, the court was able to ensure that 
both concerns were addressed in its remedial plan. This approach is 
preferable to that of the SCLC court that gave too much weight to the 
state's purported interest in maintaining the at-large feature of its 
judicial election system and did not adequately consider the other 
options available to accommodate the state and protect minority group 
members' voting rights. 
B. Clark v. R ~ e n e r ' ~ ~  
In CZark, the plaintiffs challenged the at-large election system 
utilized in Louisiana to elect trial and intermediate appellate 
judges.lZ9 At the liability phase, the court determined that the use 
of multimember judicial districts in eleven districts violated plaintiffs' 
rights under section 2.13" At the remedy stage, the district court 
granted the state an opportunity to develop legislation to redress the 
 violation^.'^' Such legislation was adopted but the voters of 
128. 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991). 
129. See supm note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual 
contentions raised in Clark. 
130. 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988). See supm note 84 and accompanying text. 
131. 777 F. Supp. at 451. In vote dilution cases, the courts traditionally afford the 
state or political subdivision a reasonable period of time to develop plans to remedy the 
violation. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37.41-43 (1982); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 
452 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1981); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978). However, 
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Louisiana rejected the Legislature's proposed  revision^.'^^ After the 
legislative initiative was rejected by the voters, the court permitted the 
parties to submit proposed remedies for the section 2 violations. After 
considering all plans and evidence submitted, the court decided that 
a subdistricting remedy would be most efficacious in correcting the 
dilution of minority voting strength.''' In the course of two opinions 
on the remedial issues, the court analyzed various alternatives 
submitted by the parties and commented on the evidence of the state's 
interest in the maintenance of the at-large election system. 
At the remedy phase, plaintiffs proposed two possible remedies. 
One was a traditional subdistricting approach with districts drawn 
that would maximize minority voting strength.'" The court 
acknowledged that there were problems inherent in the adoption of a 
subdistricting remedy. There would be a need to modify the subdistrict 
lines due to population shifts or when additional judgeships were 
created and traditional redistricting criteria would have to be employed 
in the creation of the subdistrict lines. Additionally, the court stated 
that there may be a perception that a judge elected from a small 
geographical unit would be prone to rule favorably for his or her 
constituents, thereby creating the impression of "hometown 
justice."'35 Despite these concerns, the court ultimately concluded 
that the subdistricting approach was superior to other alternatives 
because it was the only remedy that had a substantial likelihood of 
alleviating the section 2 violations. 
Another alternative proposed by the plaintiffs was the limited 
voting 0pti0n.l~~ Under this proposal, multimember districts would 
be retained in all judicial districts, and the number of votes cast by 
each elector would be limited to less than the number of positions to 
be filled. The benefit is that a minority group can overcome the effects 
of vote dilution by submergence in a predominantly white voting bloc 
by aggregating its votes behind a particular candidate. The court 
perceived numerous difficulties with this proposal. First, it  would 
require the elimination of Louisiana's majority vote requirement, thus 
requiring all candidates to run in a pool. Elections would be required 
the defendant's plan is subject to court review under a section 2 analysis. See Dillard v. 
Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-52 (11th Cir. 1987). 
132. 777 F. Supp. at 451. 
133. Id. at 468; See 777 F. Supp. 471 (reconsideration of remedy phase post- 
Chisom). 
134. 777 F. Supp. at 467. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
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at  the end of every judicial term since all candidates would qualify for 
the same office and the top vote getters would fill the available office. . 
Finally, the court stated its reluctance, in a case seeking greater access 
to the ballot, to limit the number of votes electors would have to cast 
for candidates of their choi~e.'~' For these reasons the court rejected 
the limited vote option. This option was not seen by the court as viable 
in light of the state's policy of election by majority vote.138 
A proposal to replace the popular election of judges with a 
political appointment system was suggested by the Louisiana 
Organization for Judicial Excellence (LOJE).13' LOJE contended that 
the appointment system would improve the quality of the judiciary and 
eliminate the possibility of further vote dilution. The court, however, 
took a limited view of its responsibilities a t  the remedy stage. I t  
believed that in fashioning a remedy for voting rights violations, a 
court should not intrude unnecessarily on policies expressed in the 
state's statutory or constitutional  provision^.'^" The court stated that 
its equitable powers were limited to correcting the violation found, not 
replacing the system that the state had devised for the selection of its 
judges.141 In this regard, the district court found that the state of 
Louisiana had expressed a strong preference for popular election of 
judges by a majority vote.la2 Accordingly, the court believed it  was 
precluded from eliminating that policy in favor of gubernatorial 
appointment and a retention e1ecti0n.l~~ 
Another remedy for the at-large election system was proposed 
by the Louisiana District Judges Association and the governor. They 
suggested that the majority vote requirement be replaced by a 
137. Id. at 468. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 465. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. The court stated that: 
[Tlhe federal court is not free to impose its own notion of whether a 
better system than that employed by the state could be devised. 
Federal authority becomes involved only because of a federal 
violation and, while the court has broad equitable authority to 
remedy the federal violation, that authority ends when the remedy 
is devised. 
777 F. Supp. at 467. See also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); Martin v. 
Mabus. 700 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Miss. 1988). 
142. 777 F. Supp. at 466. 
143. Id. at 466-467. 
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plurality voting standard.lU The court acknowledged that this 
approach had a certain appeal in its simplicity. There would be no 
necessity for drawing or redrawing subdistrict lines, and it would 
retain Louisiana's strong preference for popular election of judges.lJ5 
The plurality vote solution was rejected by the court because there was 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the elimination of the 
majority vote requirement, without creating subdistricts, would 
actually remedy the violation.lM Additionally, in order for a plurality 
system to provide minorities with an equal opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice, there would have to be more than two 
candidates and in Louisiana the overwhelming number of judicial 
elections involved only two candidates. Thus, in the court's opinion, the 
plurality plan did not address adequately the violation of plaintiffs' 
voting rights.14' 
In light of the numerous difficulties perceived in the 
alternatives to subdistricts, the court concluded that subdistricting was 
the only solution that would actually alleviate the section 2 violation. 
The court ordered that a subdistrict plan be devised with election 
subdistricts to be drawn in the eleven judicial districts where 
violations had been found at  the liability stage." Under the court's 
remedial order, a prospective candidate would be required to be a 
resident of the judicial district but not of his or her election 
subdi~trict. '~~ Additionally, the court found that the redistricting 
criteria relied on by defendants' expert in the creation of subdistricts 
were appropriate.lm In reviewing both the plaintiffs' and defendants' 
144. Id. at 467. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 467. 
148. Id. at 468. 
149. Id. 
150. Those factors were: 
(1) All subdistricts must be compact; 
(2) All subdistricts must be contiguous; 
(3) Parish and municipal boundaries should be maintained; 
(4) Current parish precinct lines should be followed; 
(5) Each subdistrict must be drawn using the existing number of 
judgeships; 
(6) Deviation in population must be kept to a minimum; 
(7) Gerrymandering to dilute minority voting strength must be 
avoided; 
(8) Tacking" or gerrymandering to concentrate minority voting 
strength in an attempt to achieve proportional representation must 
be avoided. 
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plans, the court found that neither completely addressed the 
redistricting criteria and ordered the parties to submit new plans or 
stipulate as to the configuration of the districts.lsl 
Before the court could review proposals from the parties for the 
implementation of the subdistrict remedy, the Supreme Court decided 
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association. In light of the Court's 
holding that a state's interest in the preservation of its at-large judicial 
election system was a legitimate factor to be considered by a district 
court in assessing a section 2 vote dilution case, the Clark court 
provided the defendants the opportunity to submit additional evidence 
regarding the state's interest. Numerous defense witnesses testified 
that a subdistricting remedy would produce perceptions of "hometown" 
justice, subject judges to special interest group pressures, that the 
appointment system would produce a more qualified judiciary than 
election by subdistrict, and that election districts should be linked with 
the jurisdictional parameters of a judge.ls2 Plaintiffs called an 
African-American circuit judge from Mississippi, Robert Gibbs, who 
had been elected in 1990 under the remedial plan developed in 
Martin.153 Judge Gibbs testified that he was not subject to local 
pressure from his subdistrict electorate, and, in most cases he did not 
know whether a party resided within or without his election district. 
He further stated that the perception of minorities concerning the 
judicial system had improved since his election to the bench.'" In 
comparison to the improved perception of Mississippi black citizens of 
the judicial system, three of the plaintiffs in Clark testified that the 
general perception of the judicial system in the Louisiana minority 
community was one of apprehension and mistrust. 
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that although 
numerous witnesses testified about the fear of hometown justice and 
the need to link a judge's jurisdiction with his or her electorate, these 
concerns were not sufficiently vital so as to preclude a finding of 
section 2 violations. The court accordingly reaffirmed its earlier 
liability  finding^.'^^ On the basis of the record, the court also ruled 
that the interests advanced by the state were not sdXcient to preclude 
777 F. Supp. at 468. 
151. Id. 
152. 777 F. Supp at 475-77. 
153. Id. at 477. See supm note 113 and accompanying text. 
154. 777 F. Supp at 477. 
155. Id. at 479. 
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the adoption of a subdistricting remedy.'= With respect to the 
appropriate remedy, the court concluded that the alternatives to 
subdistricting would require a greater intrusion into state policies than 
was appropriate to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' voting rights. 
In accordance with its rulings on liability and the appropriate remedy, 
the court concluded by approving various proposals for the creation of 
subdistri~ts. '~~ 
The court in Clark was faced with the daunting prospect of 
remedying a finding of vote dilution in a judicial election case without 
any guidance from the Supreme Court or the circuit court. Guided by 
the principle that the remedy must be tailored to fit the violation, the 
court refused to engage in a wholesale replacement of the election 
system with an appointive system. While the court believed it  was 
restrained under traditional equitable principles from engaging in a 
complete restructuring of the method of selecting state court judges, 
there are other sound reasons of policy for a court's refusal to 
dismantle a judicial election system in order to remedy a vote dilution 
determination. When minority voters seek federal intervention to 
remedy a deprivation of their rights, they are seeking to improve their 
access to the elective system. They are calling upon the federal 
judiciary to step in and, if a violation is found, to aid in the creation of 
an election system that will equalize the rights of the minority with 
those of the majority. It would be anomalous if after finding a vote 
dilution violation, the federal court, instead of improving minority 
access to the electoral system, orders that minority group members can 
no longer vote for the subject office. That result would send a terrible 
message to future voting rights and civil rights plaintiffs. While there 
are arguments advanced that the appointment system would enable 
more African-Americans to become judges, the best guarantee of that 
reality is to afford minority group members the opportunity to elect the 
judges who will sit in judgment of them. It is for this reason that the 
subdistricting remedy is the most appropriate remedy for section 2 
violations. I t  is the remedy that best insures that the members of the 
protected classes will have the opportunity to vote and elect 
representatives of their choice. 
Additionally, the Clark court properly rejected the state's 
contentions that its interests were so compelling that a violation could 
not be established or, alternatively, that a subdistricting remedy was 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 481-83. 
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inappropriate. The Clark court refused to accept a t  face value the 
assertions of the state's witnesses. In order to overcome the liability 
finding, the court required the state to come forward with credible 
evidence demonstrating that the at-large scheme was essential to the 
advancement of a legitimate state interest. Also, the court, in 
considering various alternatives, gave all parties the opportunity to 
advance alternative methods for protecting the state's alleged interests 
and remedying the violations. In the end, the court concluded that the 
least intrusive and most efficacious method of achieving both ends was 
to create subdistricts with African-American majorities. This was a 
legitimate response in light of the fact that the African-American 
population was geographically compact. In other situations, where 
there is a lack of geographical cohesion or the state demonstrates a 
compelling governmental interest for maintaining an at-large system, 
the limited voting option or other alternatives should be explored. 
However, in those cases where geographical cohesion is established, 
the subdistricting remedy represents the optimal choice to ensure the 
protection of the rights of minority group members to equal access to 
the political process. 
The United State Supreme Court surprised its liberal critics by 
ruling in Chisom that state court judges were subject to the 
requirements of section 2 when those judges achieved office by popular 
election. While this decision represents a tremendous opportunity for 
minority voters, it could still be a hollow victory if the courts narrowly 
interpret the ruling. In Houston Lawyers' Association, the Court 
afforded the states an opportunity to undercut the holding in Chisom. 
By d i n g  that a state's interest in the preservation of its system of 
electing judges on an at-large basis was a legitimate factor to be 
considered in a vote dilution case, the Court gave the states and 
federal judges, who may be inclined to disagree with the broad holding 
in Chisom, the opportunity to undercut the promise of Chisom. 
The concern is that the federal courts will permit a state to 
advance arguments that it has a strong interest in the preservation of 
its system as a counterpoint to a prima facie case of vote dilution. 
Some courts may give greater weight to the state's contentions and 
rule against minority voters a t  the liability stage. This was the 
approach of the SCLC court that held that plaintiffs had not 
established a section 2 violation, in large part, due to the court's 
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acceptance of the governmental interest argument of the state.'* 
This method of resolving the liability determination places too great an 
emphasis on the state's interest and undervalues proof of the Gingles 
criteria and Senate Report  factor^.'^' A superior approach was that 
taken by the Clark court that refused to accept speculative arguments 
regarding the state's interest and required credible evidence 
demonstrating the existence of this factor.lsO Additionally, the Clark 
court permitted plaintiffs to adduce evidence suggesting that there 
were alternative remedies that would rectify the dilution of minority 
voting strength and protect the state's purported interests.'" B Y 
permitting such proof, the district court provided the plaintiffs with an 
opportunity to demonstrate that the state's interest could be 
accommodated by alternatives that did not dilute minority voting 
strength. 
In addition to giving the states a means of limiting the effect 
of Chisom, the Court also left the lower courts at  sea with respect to 
how to assess a vote dilution case involving judicial at-large elections 
and the appropriate remedy where liability is established. The cases 
that have addressed these issues have all chosen to follow the dictates 
of Gingles and the Senate Report factors.'= Since vote dilution cases 
in the legislative context have been resolved by utilizing the threshold 
test of Gingles, this method, in conjunction with reliance on the Senate 
Report factors, should be relied upon by the courts in determining 
liability in the judicial setting. 
Finally, the issue of the appropriate remedy for a section 2 
violation will have to be resolved in future litigation. Here, as in the 
liability phase, the courts appear to be tuning to the traditional 
subdistricting approachemployed in legislative vote dilution cases.'63 
While the subdistricting remedy is an appropriate means of alleviating 
minority vote dilution, the courts should be willing to consider other 
alternatives, such as limited voting,. where either a state has 
demonstrated a compelling interest in the maintenance of its system 
or where a politically cohesive minority group population is not 
geographically compact. 
The Voting Rights Act is one of the most effective tools that 
158. See supm notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
159. See supm notes 56,64-66 and accompanying text. 
160. See supm note 88 and accompanying text. 
161. See supm notes 134-136 and accompanying text. 
162. Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Clark v. Roemer, 777 
F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991); SCLC v. Evans, 785 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1992). 
163. See supm notes 120,121,150 and accompanying text. 
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minority communities have for improving the representation that they 
receive from legislative and executive officials. With the holding in 
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association, racial and language 
minority groups have been given an opportunity to diversify the state 
judiciary and to enhance the quality of justice accorded members of 
these groups. But these guarantees of diversity and quality will be 
empty vessels unless minority groups vigorously seek to have these 
decisions enforced. 
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